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Abstract:  This paper discusses aspects of recent policy towards mobile telephony in the 
U.K., including (i) the level of retail charges for calls from fixed to mobile networks, (ii) the 
level of call termination charges on mobile networks, and (iii) the level of connection 
subsidies offered by mobile networks.  A formal model of the market is introduced, which 
offers a direct linkage between call termination rates and the level of connection subsidy.  
This provides a framework for discussing the ideal level of call termination charges on 







The desirable degree of liberalisation in fixed telephony is a controversial topic within many 
countries in Europe and elsewhere.  Most countries, however, have in recent years followed a 
policy of reasonably full liberalisation for mobile telephony, and two, three or four mobile 
networks often compete for subscribers in the same area.  Partly this contrasting approach is 
due to the different cost characteristics of mobile telephony, with sunk costs playing a less 
important role than in the fixed sector, and partly it is due to the perception that social 
obligations, which are often used as a justification for entry restrictions, apply more to the 
fixed sector.  Because of this greater liberalisation, many of the complicating factors which 
arise in the fixed sector are not an issue in mobile telephony, which in many respects behaves 
as other unregulated oligopolies.   
 
However, there remain a number of special features in the sector which are important for 
public policy to address, and these are discussed in the context of the U.K. industry in this 
paper.  These include (i) the level of retail charges for calls from fixed to mobile networks, 
(ii) the level of call termination charges on mobile networks, and (iii) the level of connection 
subsidies offered by mobile networks, all of which are the subject of recent debate in Britain.
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   This paper will not discuss other mobile services such as radio paging, the method by which mobile licences 
are allocated (such as spectrum auctions), nor the desirable number of licences which should be issued.  Also, 
Britain has a somewhat complicated industry structure in the mobile sector in which the network operators are 
restricted in their ability to retail services directly to the public, and must often act through intermediaries.  As 
this system appears to be coming to an end, this aspect of U.K. policy is not discussed in the paper, but see Oftel 
(1997b) for more details. 
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The mobile sector in the U.K. very briefly is as follows.
2
  The U.K. is a fairly typical country 
in Europe when it comes to mobile telephone usage, and the fraction of the population who 
are mobile subscribers is given below for various countries: 
 
Table 1:  Mobile penetration rates in selected countries (1997) 
 
France Germany Spain U.K. Italy Nordic 
      
4.3% 7.2% 7.7% 11.9% 12.1% 28.2% 
 (Source: Financial Times, 11 June 1997.)  
 
The U.K. has four mobile network operators, and there are no plans to license further firms 
for the foreseeable future.  These were licensed in two stages.  In 1985 Cellnet and Vodafone 
began operations initially using analogue technology, and in 1994 these were joined by 
Mercury One-2-One (MOTO) and Orange using (DCS) digital technology.  (At the same 
time, Cellnet and Vodafone were granted licences to use another digital technology, GSM, in 
addition to their existing analogue networks.)  Cellnet is majority-owned by BT, the main 
fixed operator in the U.K., and MOTO is majority-owned by Mercury, which is one of BT’s 
main competitors in the fixed sector.  Thus Cellnet and Vodafone had a substantial head-start 
in the industry which is reflected in the current market shares of mobile subscribers.  Of the 
approximately 6.3 million subscribers in Britain in 1996, the four operators had market shares 
as follows:   
 
Table 2:  Market shares of subscribers in the U.K. (September 1996) 
 
Vodafone Cellnet Orange MOTO 
    
41% 40% 11% 8% 
 (Source: Oftel, 1997a, Table 24.) 
 
A different pattern of market shares is seen if we look at outgoing call-minutes: 
 
Table 3:  Market shares of outgoing call-minutes in the U.K. (July 1996) 
 
Vodafone Cellnet Orange MOTO 
    
31% 28% 11% 30% 
 (Source: Oftel, 1997a, Table 23.) 
 
The reason for this disparity is that MOTO currently has a tariff policy of offering unlimited 
free calls in off-peak periods in many regions, which of course promotes the use of its 
network.  Naturally, this high usage is not mirrored in the revenue shares: 
 
Table 4:  Market shares of revenue from outgoing calls and rentals (July 1996) 
 
Vodafone Cellnet Orange MOTO 
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   See Armstrong (1997) for a more detailed survey of the whole telecommunications industry in the U.K., 
together with an account of recent policy by Oftel (the industry regulator in the country). 
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45% 38% 9% 7% 
 (Source: Oftel, 1997a, Table 25.) 
 
(Note that is not possible to disentangle revenues corresponding to the monthly rental charge 
from the call usage revenues since all operators offer tariffs in which a subscriber receives a, 
possibly large, number of ‘free’ calls included in the monthly fee.)  Thus we see that 
Vodafone tends to attract subscribers with a slightly higher revenue stream than the other 
operators.   
 
It is reasonable to describe the market for mobile subscribers as being quite competitive, 
especially since the entry of Orange and MOTO: operators advertise heavily about their 
prices, tariff innovations (such as per-second billing, and discounted calls to others on the 
same network), and regional coverage.  Although Orange and MOTO have relatively small 
market shares at present, they are starting to catch up.  For instance, the percentage growth of 
subscribers over the year 1995 to 1996 for the four networks is as follows: 
 
Table 5:  Net subscriber growth from September 1995 to September 1996 
 
Vodafone Cellnet Orange MOTO 
    
29% 22% 151% 34% 
(Source: Oftel, 1997a, Table 24.) 
 
This fairly competitive marketplace is likely to be made more so since Oftel has announced 
that it intends to require all mobile operators to provide “number portability”, so that a 
subscriber is allowed to keep her old mobile telephone number if she chooses to change 
operator, from 1998 (see Oftel, 1997d).  Many subscribers, on both fixed and mobile 
networks, believe that having to change telephone number if they change operator is a major 
barrier to switching, and hence without number portability operators can to some extent treat 
existing subscribers as being “captive”. 
 
However, the fact that this market is competitive has little bearing on the effectiveness of 







2. CALLS FROM FIXED TO MOBILE NETWORKS 
 
The charges that fixed networks make for calls to mobile subscribers is currently unregulated 
in the U.K., even for BT, and there is some concern that such charges may be too high in 
relation to the associated cost, even taking as given the (high) termination rates payable to 
mobile networks.  (These termination rates are discussed in the next section.)  The market 
share of calls from the various fixed networks to mobile subscribers is as follows: 
 
Table 6:  Market share of call minutes from fixed to mobile networks (July 1996) 
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BT Mercury Others 
   
84% 12% 4% 
(Source: Oftel, 1997a, Table 5.) 
 
Thus we see that there is at least the possibility that market power in the fixed sector could be 
exploited to the disadvantage of fixed subscribers (and also to mobile subscribers who 
thereby receive fewer calls than is desirable).  The following table summarises the charges 
involved in this market for the two main players, BT and Mercury: 
 
Table 7:  Retail and call termination charges for calls from fixed to mobile networks 
(July 1996) 
 
 BT Mercury 
   
Average per-minute retail 
charge for calls from fixed 







   
Average per-minute call 










   
Average per-minute 








(Source: Oftel, 1997a, Tables 4, 5, 20 and 21.) 
 
The average per-minute retail charge for calls from fixed to mobile subscribers include 
various discounts offered by BT and Mercury for high-usage subscribers, but exclude value-
added tax.  For comparison, BT’s current charge for calling the U.S.A. during peak-time is 
around 20p per minute (excluding value-added tax and any discounts offered by the 
company).  Similarly, BT’s average per-minute charge for a ‘National’ call, i.e. a long-
distance call within the country, is less than 5p excluding value-added tax (see Oftel, 1997a, 
Tables 4 and 5).  Thus subscribers on fixed networks currently are required to pay a rather 
substantial charge when they call mobile users.  Moreover, there is evidence that subscribers 
are not always aware of the high charges for calling mobile networks - see Oftel (1997c, 
section 7). 
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   Care must be taken when calculating average call termination payments from Oftel (1997a).  For instance, 
Table 20 shows that BT paid £110 million to mobile networks for interconnection during July to September 
1996, Table 5 shows that 534 million minutes of calls originated on BT’s network destined for the mobiles 
networks, and Table 21 shows that BT required 668 million minutes of call termination from mobile networks 
(all during the same period).  The discrepancy between 534 and 668 is due to the fact that other networks 
(including mobile networks) use BT as an intermediary to deliver calls destined for mobile networks, and so BT 
demands more call termination than is required from its own subscribers.  (It is costly for many small networks 
to negotiate bilateral interconnection contracts with each other.)  The average payment BT makes for call 
termination is thus 110 divided by 668, not divided by 534. 
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The table shows that a large part of this retail charge is paid out in call termination payments 
required by mobile networks.  In fact, the charges that fixed operators must pay mobile 
networks to deliver their calls are subject to individual negotiation, and therefore differ 
according to both the fixed and the mobile network. For instance, in 1996 BT paid 
substantially more to Vodafone and Cellnet than it did to Orange and MOTO, although this 
differential has been narrowing recently, and this difference is reflected in its retail charges - 
see Oftel (1997c, section 2) for more detail.  One possible reason for why BT was prepared to 
offer more generous terms to Vodafone and Cellnet than to Orange and MOTO is that BT has 
a controlling interest in Cellnet, and hence has less incentive to negotiate low charges. 
 
On average, however, Table 7 shows that both BT and Mercury have a substantial margin of 
nearly 10p per minute on their calls to mobile networks, a margin which is approximately 
double the level of BT’s average long-distance charge.  Therefore, unless it costs a fixed 
network much more to deliver a call to the point of interconnect with a mobile network than it 
does to provide an end-to-end long-distance call within its own network, it seems likely that 
fixed networks indeed charge more for calls to mobile networks than is justified by the 
associated costs.  Moreover, even though BT has more market power than Mercury in this 
market (see Table 5), Mercury behaves no “better” than BT in this regard.  One possible 
remedy for this problem might be for Oftel to require, perhaps informally, that the main fixed 
operators do not charge more for calls to mobile networks than the associated call termination 
charges plus their associated long-distance retail charge.  
 
To get a very rough impression of the scope for possible welfare gains from controlling these 
retail charges, consider the following table which describes the reduction in “dead-weight 
loss” caused by bringing price down from its current unregulated level of about 25p per 
minute to marginal cost.  I know of no public data about demand elasticities for calls from 
fixed to mobile networks, and so have included a range of elasticities in the table.  Two levels 
of marginal cost are considered: 20p per minute, which corresponds to a fixed network cost of 
5p together with a mobile call termination cost of 15p (roughly equal to their current average 
termination charge), and 15p per minute which corresponds to a fixed network cost of 5p 
together with a mobile call termination cost of 10p (which is less than their current average 
charge which Oftel believes are too high compared to cost).  
 
Table 8:  Reduction in dead-weight loss resulting from setting price equal to marginal 




 elasticity = 0.5 elasticity = 1 elasticity = 2 
    
marginal cost = 20p 5 11 21 
    
marginal cost = 15p 21 43 85 
 
Thus we see that welfare gains from regulating the retail prices for calling mobile users from 
fixed networks are neither negligible (unless elasticity of demand is low or costs are high), 
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  These calculations have been made assuming a linear demand function for calls from fixed to mobile 
networks, a constant marginal cost of making such calls, an initial retail charge of 25p per minute, and equal 
welfare weights placed on consumer surplus and industry profits.  The initial level of demand is taken to be 2136 
million minutes per annum, which is four times the last available quarterly figure given in Oftel (1997a, Table 
5).  Finally, the effect of value-added tax has been ignored.   
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nor enormous.  Whether these benefits outweigh the associated regulatory costs of imposing 
new controls is a judgement best made by players in the industry. 
 
A complementary way to reduce the high retail charges to that of new regulation, of course, 
would be to reduce call termination charges, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
3. TERMINATION CHARGES BY MOBILE NETWORKS 
 
Charges made to their subscribers are by no means the only source of revenue to mobile 
operators, and a network will also receive payments for terminating calls made to its 
subscribers originating on other networks.  The vast majority of these incoming calls originate 
on the fixed networks.  The revenue received by mobile operators from providing call 
termination typically makes up a large proportion of their overall revenue.  For instance, 
between July and September 1996 the mobile operators in the U.K. received £461 million in 
revenue from calls and monthly rentals from their subscribers and received £140 million in 
revenue from providing call termination.  (They paid out the relatively small sum of £20 
million for call termination on the fixed networks - see Oftel, 1997a, Tables 18, 20 and 22.)  
There is currently some debate as to whether the level of these charges is too high when 
compared to associated costs. 
 
Current policy in the U.K. is that in the first instance a mobile operator enters into bilateral 
negotiation with another network such as BT over the choice of its termination charges, and if 
such negotiations succeed then there is no intervention by Oftel.  (Such a policy has an 
obvious drawback when one network has a controlling interest in the other, as BT has with 
Cellnet and Mercury has with MOTO, in that high charges may be agreed.)  If, however, the 
parties fail to agree, as has happened between Mercury and both Vodafone and Cellnet, then 
Oftel steps in to determine the appropriate charges.  The basis on which these charges are 
determined is that of “fully allocated costs”, a necessarily vague basis leaving much room for 
argument over which costs are truly “common” and which can be allocated unambiguously to 
certain services.   
 
This issue is complicated considerably in the mobile sector in the U.K. by the prevalence of 
various kinds of subsidies and inducements paid to subscribers when they join a mobile 
network.  For instance, networks often offer “free” handsets to new subscribers which cost 
the network itself £200 or more, together with “free” insurance for a year, and so on.  
Sometimes a network will even offer direct bribes, such as a free compact disk player, upon 
joining.  It is true that such subsidies are usually paid in return for signing a long-term 
contract with the network, typically for a year.
5
  Thus some of these subsidies will be paid 
back over the course of the contract, and so are not true subsidies.  Nevertheless, there is 
usually a large element of actual subsidy, even taking into account the long-term contracts, 
paid to new subscribers.   
 
In addition to these subsidies, networks usually make “incentive payments” to the high-street 
dealers who actually sign up subscribers, say around £50 per new subscriber.  Thus, to 
illustrate, a network may face a cost of £250 to connect a new subscriber (£200 for the 
handset and £50 as a reward to the dealer), and may get back £120 in guaranteed revenue 
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   In Britain it is actually quite difficult to join a mobile network without having a handset supplied at the same 
time.  Why handsets and the retailing of airtime are so strongly bundled together in the U.K. is unclear. 
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stream from a 12 month contract (if the subscriber pays £10 per month in rental charge) - see 
Oftel (1997c) for more detail on the complex pattern of cross-subsidy within the sector.  The 
question is, if one is using a fully allocated cost methodology to determine call termination 
rates, should these subsidies paid to new subscribers count as a “cost” to be allocated partly to 
the cost of terminating calls?     Oftel (1997c, para. 5.11) states that if such subsidies are 
included as common costs to be allocated partly to call termination, termination charges 




Oftel argues that there are really three basic services offered by mobile operators: outgoing 
calls, incoming calls and “access”.  The last service consists in simply being connected to the 
network, and is separate from making or receiving calls.  With this categorisation of services, 
any “costs” to do with subsidising network connection should be allocated to the “access” 
service, and hence not at all to the cost of terminating incoming calls - see Oftel (1997c, 
section 5).  Naturally, the mobile operators disagree with this methodology, and insist that 
there are just two basic services, incoming and outgoing calls, and that the cost of connection 
subsidies should be allocated to the two services in proportion to traffic in each direction.  
Indeed, Oftel (1997c, para. 5.16) states that Vodafone argues that if Oftel does not allocate a 
proportion of connection subsidies to call termination, i.e. if its termination charges are 
reduced significantly, then its connection subsidies could be reduced and call charges for 
outgoing calls could be increased.      
 
While one can have some sympathy with the position that there are only two basic services - 
it is not clear what exactly the “access” service is other than the ability to make and receive 
calls - it is not obvious that connection subsidies are necessarily desirable.  (For instance, 
such “connection” subsidies are only rarely observed in other industries with somewhat 
similar characteristics, such as cameras and film, or compact disk players and compact disks.)  
It is useful to have an economic framework for discussing the issue of call termination 
charges together with connection subsidies, and one way to do this is discussed in the 
following section. 
 
4. A Model of the Mobile Telecommunications Industry 
 
There are two sectors: fixed and mobile.  The latter is assumed to be competitive and all 
charges except for call termination are unregulated there.  All mobile operators and all mobile 
subscribers are assumed to be identical.  The cost of structure of a mobile network consists of 
a fixed connection cost  k  per subscriber, a constant marginal cost  c  for providing outgoing 
calls and a constant marginal cost  C  for terminating calls from other networks.  The cost  k  
is the cost of a handset together with any other costs associated with subscribers (e.g. billing 
costs, and the “incentive payments” to dealers if these are really essential).  The cost of 
making calls  c  is taken to be the average cost of making calls to other networks.  Therefore, 
if a subscriber receives  Q  calls and makes  q  calls, a firm’s costs for that subscriber are 
 
CQ cq k   . 
 
 The model is simplified if we make the following series of strong assumptions: 
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   As mentioned above, in 1991 Mercury was unable to agree interconnection terms with Cellnet and Vodafone, 
and Oftel was asked to intervene.  When it did so it did not allow connection subsidies to be allocated to the call 
termination service - see Oftel (1997, section 5). 
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(A1) All calls from mobile networks are made to the fixed sector. 
(A2) Mobile subscribers gain no utility from receiving calls. 
(A3) The number of mobile subscribers is not affected by tariffs in the mobile  sector, and 
is normalised to one. 
(A4) The price of calls from the fixed to the mobile sector is equal to the associated 
 marginal cost (including the termination charge on mobile networks). 
 
We make assumption A1 so that the choice of the charge for mobile call termination does not 
affect the cost  c  of making calls from mobile networks.  While this is not precisely true, in 
the U.K. at least it is a good approximation.
7
  The likely effect of relaxing the other 
assumptions is postponed until later.   
 
Fixed operators have to pay  T  per call to a mobile network for call termination.  If  c f   is the 
marginal cost for the fixed network for making calls to the point of interconnect to the mobile 
networks, then A4 implies that with this charge the retail price for calls from the fixed sector 
to the mobile sector is  
 
P c Tf   . 
 
(The assumption that the price of calls from fixed to mobile networks is equal to cost could 
be because the fixed sector is competitive or, more likely, because the charge is regulated.)  
Suppose that with the price  P  each subscriber on a mobile network receives  Q(P)  calls 
from the fixed network.  Then the profit per subscriber made by a mobile operator for 
terminating calls is 
 
 I fT Q c T T C( ) ( ) ( )     . 
 
Suppose a mobile network sets the fixed connection charge  f  and the per-call charge  p  for 
making calls.  Suppose that once a subscriber has joined a mobile network with call charge   p  
she makes  q(p)  calls.  (This is assumed not to depend on the price of incoming calls  P.)  
Then an operator’s total profit per subscriber is 
 
q p p c T f kI( ) ( ) ( )      . 
 
The mobile sector is competitive, and market equilibrium in the sector is such that (i) 
operators’ profits are driven down to zero, and (ii) subscriber utility is maximised subject to 
the break-even constraint.  In this case, market equilibrium results in marginal cost pricing for 
outgoing calls,  
 
p c  , 
 
and the connection charge recovers any profit shortfall, i.e. 
                                                          
7
   For instance, in the period April to May 1996 Oftel (1997a, Tables 19 and 23) reports that there were 1.325 
billion minutes of calls originating on the four mobile networks, and that the fixed sector received 1.255 billion 
minutes of calls from the mobile sector.  This suggests that around 95% of calls from mobile subscribers are 
destined for the fixed network. 
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f k TI  ( )  . 
 
This implies that the termination charge  T  has no effect on the charge for outgoing calls  p  
(which is always equal to marginal cost), but only on the connection charge  f.  In fact, 
rewriting the above expression shows that the connection subsidy  k - f  is equal to the profits 
generated by delivering calls   I T( ) .  Thus if  T  is set above the marginal cost of 
terminating calls then  f  <  k  and the mobile operator “subsidises” the cost of connection.  
(More properly, it is the users of the fixed network who are subsidising mobile connection via 
their termination payments.)  It may even be that   I T( )   is so large that operators pay 
subscribers to join, so that  f  <  0.  Thus, in this model the cause of connection subsidies, 
which is a feature of the U.K. market, is directly caused by setting termination charges above 
marginal cost, not because this “makes entry to the service affordable for consumers”, as 




What, then, is the desirable choice of  T  in this model?  Consumer surplus in the market for 
calls from fixed to mobile sectors with price  P  is  V(P),  where  V P Q P' ( ) ( )  ,  and the 
consumer surplus of mobile subscribers is v p f( )    where  v p q p' ( ) ( )  .  Therefore, total 
welfare when the call termination charge is  T  is 
 
V c T v c k Tf I( ) ( ) [ ( )]     .    
 
(Profits in both sectors are zero.)  This is maximised by setting 
 
T C  
 
so that there is marginal cost pricing of call termination.  This in turn implies that mobile 
connection is not subsidised in equilibrium.  This, then, broadly supports Oftel’s stated 
position that call termination should not have associated to it any other costs not directly 
associated with providing the service. 
 
In general terms, the affect of relaxing the assumptions made in this model goes as follows: 
 
 If  A2 does not hold, so that mobile subscribers gain (positive) utility from receiving calls, 
then this will have no effect on equilibrium behaviour in the mobile industry for a given  
T,  but in welfare terms this will give a motive to set  T  below marginal cost (which then 
implies that the retail charge  P  is set below marginal cost) in order to take account of the 
call externality. 
 If  A4  does not hold, say because the fixed network is unregulated and not fully 
competitive (as is the case in the U.K.), then  P c Tf  .  In this case this again provides 
a motive for setting  T C   in order to overcome the price-cost markup on calls from the 
fixed to mobile sectors. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,  A3  may not hold so that there is an elastic supply 
of mobile subscribers.  If this is so, and this seems likely in practice, then setting a higher 
value of  T  will cause more people to become mobile subscribers since their utility from 
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   In this regard it is interesting to note the Finland, which like the other Nordic countries has particularly mobile 
usage (see Table 1 above), does not allow operators to subsidise handsets. 
 10 
joining a network then increases.  Since the utility of fixed network users will rise the 
more mobile subscribers there are because of network externalities (they then have more 
people to call), this will provide a reason for setting  T  >  C  in order to encourage 
network growth.
9
   
 
In sum, this model proposes a direct linkage between the setting of high call termination 
charges on mobile networks and the use of connection subsidies to new subscribers.  Putting 
the matter argumentatively, if termination charges are high, mobile operators offer bribes to 
potential subscribers to join a network so that their callers then pay substantial charges to 
contact them.  This pattern of cross-subsidy is undesirable unless the network externality 
effect dominates the call externality effect, in which case it is socially desirable to set 
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